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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There has been a sea change in the views of the economics profession as well 
as economic policy-makers over the past decade or so regarding the role of the 
government in the development process. Indeed, it is now becoming conventional 
wisdom that government can no longer be a dominant player in economic activities, 
but rather should restrict itself to providing an “enabling” environment within which 
the private sector can take the lead and flourish. More specifically, government 
intervention in the economy has to be designed carefully so as to support the private 
sector and not inhibit its development. The general acceptance of this paradigm is 
evident in the steadily declining importance of government activities in the 
economies of most of the developing world. 
But does this new paradigm mean that government investment has no role 
whatsoever in affecting growth in developing countries? Reality is that public 
investment still represents a large share of total investment in the majority of 
developing countries, and the question is what role it plays in relation to private 
investment in stimulating economic growth. The objective of this paper is to 
ascertain empirically for a large group of developing countries the relative 
importance of public and private investment in promoting and sustaining growth. 
Despite considerable interest in the issue, the empirical evidence on the 
relative effects of public and private investment on growth in developing countries is 
quite limited. A number of recent studies examining this issue have shown that 
private investment has a larger positive impact on growth than public investment 
[Khan and Reinhart (1990); Coutinho and Gallo (1991); Serven and Solimano (1990) 
and Khan and Kumar (1997)]. However, many of the existing studies have used 
small samples of countries over limited time periods, so that the validity and 
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robustness of this conclusion is still in doubt. Moreover, to examine the relative 
effects of public and private investment, a number of other important issues related 
to differences in the two components of investment across developing country 
regions or across countries in different income groups need to be investigated. 
Finally, other determinants of growth, such as macroeconomic instability, which 
have received considerable attention in the recent literature, have also to be taken 
into account when assessing this issue. 
The empirical analysis in this paper is undertaken for a sample of 95 
developing countries for the period 1970–90. The large sample allows for 
consideration of the hypothesis that there are significant differences in the 
differential effects of public and private investment on growth for four developing 
country regions—Africa, Asia, Middle East, and Latin America.
1 Such an 
examination has merit in view of the marked differences in the performance of 
developing countries during the last two decades. Asian countries, for instance, have 
had generally a superior performance than have African or Latin American countries. 
To the extent that the steady-state conditions underlying the differential growth 
performance—reflecting, for example, the rate of technological change and 
population growth—are likely to be more similar across developing countries, 
looking specifically at these countries can yield additional insights into the process 
of convergence of real per capital incomes of developing countries.
2 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II first discusses the 
extent to which public and private investment may be complementary or substitutes, 
and then describes the estimation equations to be used in the empirical analysis. 
Section III contains the main empirical results. While the bulk of the empirical 
analysis is undertaken using cross-sectional data and single equation estimation 
techniques, estimates using pooled-time series data, with growth computed over 
different time horizons, and instrumental variable techniques to take into account the 
simultaneity between private investment and growth, are also presented. Section IV 
examines the implications of the differential impact of public and private investment 
for the speed of convergence to a steady-state. Finally, Section V contains a 
summary of the main findings. 
 
II.  PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 
 
1.  Patterns of Public and Private Investment 
The  magnitude  of  public  and  private  investment  in  developing countries 
over the  last  two  decades  is illustrated  in Table 1. It  is striking  that  public  sector 
1The diversity in performance among developing country regions has become particularly evident 
during the 1980s; see, for instance, Ossa (1990) and Kumar (1992). 
2Existing studies of convergence have combined developing and industrial countries, and thus 
their results are applicable to both groups; see Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). Government Investment and Economic Growth  421
Table 1 
Public and Private Investment in Developing Countries, 1970–90 
1 
(As Percent of GDP) 
 Total  Public  Private 
 
Africa (46)  19.7  10.6  9.1 
 
Asia (14)  20.5  8.6  11.9 
 
Latin America  (24)  19.3  7.9  11.4 
 
Europe and  
  Middle East  (11)  24.5  14.1  10.4 
 
All Developing  
  Countries  (95)  20.3  10.0  10.3 
 1Data are unweighted averages.  Number of countries is given in brackets; for sample of countries, see 
Appendix. 
 
investment in developing countries accounts for nearly half of total investment. In 
industrial countries, by contrast, public investment accounts for less than one fifth of 
total investment.
3 To the extent that the needs of developing countries for 
infrastructural and related capital are greater than those of the industrial countries, 
and given the indivisibilities and risks involved in the provision of such capital, the 
share of public investment might be expected to be higher in lower-income countries. 
Nevertheless, the information in Table 1 raises questions concerning the efficiency 
of public investment relative to private investment and its contribution to long-run 
growth in developing countries. 
In general, public investment in infrastructure, by being complementary to 
private investment, could increase the marginal product of private capital.
4 This is 
most likely to be true in those developing countries where the existing stock of 
infrastructure capital is generally inadequate. In this regard, it is worth noting in 
Table 1 that the share of public investment in countries in Africa and the Middle East 
is higher than that of private investment; in Asian and Latin American countries 
3This is based on an unweighted average for the OECD countries for the 1980s. 
4See Blejer and Khan (1984).  For industrial countries, Aschauer (1989, 1989a) finds that 
investment in infrastructure has had a very strong positive effect on private sector productivity.  However, 
these findings remain controversial largely because the marginal productivity of infrastructure implied by 
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private investment has a higher share. It has become evident over the last few years, 
however, that public investment in infrastructure may not automatically have a 
beneficial impact on private investment and growth. In many cases, political-
bureaucratic motivations have led to expenditures in infrastructure facilities that 
were sub-optimal. This occurred in part because the concern was with maximising 
employment than with creating these facilities at low cost. Also, it occurred because 
regional or other political considerations resulted in uneconomic location, size, or 
even sector of the investment projects. 
In addition to investment in infrastructure, a large part of public investment is 
undertaken by state-owned enterprises. In most developing countries, industrial 
policy and the regulatory framework have linked private sector production directly to 
public sector activities in both goods and factor markets. For instance, an expansion 
of the capacity of public enterprises to produce industrial inputs—including 
production of basic metals, chemicals, and so on—is necessary before the private 
sector can undertake investments in sectors that are dependent on these basic inputs. 
Given the pervasive role of public enterprises in many countries, capacity expansion 
by such enterprises can lead to an increase in private sector investment undertaken 
for the purpose of satisfying the additional demand. This complementarity may have 
been encouraged through the granting of selective incentives for directing private 
investment to fulfil public investment plans. 
The above considerations suggest that while the public sector capital stock 
may be complementary to private sector activities and have a positive effect on 
growth, its efficiency may be questionable sometimes. Moreover, in many 
developing countries public sector enterprises often compete directly with the private 
sector in the provision of goods and services. In these cases, an increase in public 
investment could have an adverse effect on private investment both directly, as well 
as indirectly via the public sector budget constraint. In the case of the latter, each of 
the different modes of financing public sector investment can have an effect on 
private investment. If, for example, public investment is financed by increasing 
taxes, it may further exacerbate distortions in the economy and increase the costs of 
inputs, leading to an adverse effect on expected output growth and private 
investment. Where it is financed by market borrowing, public investment could have 
an adverse effect on the availability of credit, as well as on the real cost of capital to 
the private sector. Finally, in the case of monetisation of deficits, crowding out 
occurs through an increase in the inflation rate, which creates uncertainty with regard 
to the expected returns from investment. 
 
2.  Specification of Equations 
The differential impact of private and public sector investment on growth can 
be evaluated via the framework of an extended neoclassical growth model [Solow  Government Investment and Economic Growth  423
(1956)]. In this well-known model, capital accumulation, growth of labour force, and 
technical change are the key determinants of real per capita income. Thus real per 
















∈ ...  ...  (1) 
where Y and L denote real output and labour respectively; α refers to the share of 
aggregate capital in income; S is the aggregate saving (and investment) rate; n and γ 
are respectively the growth rate of labour and technology; δ denotes depreciation of 
the capital stock; and ∈ is an error term. 
The above model was extended by including separately public and private 
capital stocks. Assuming that both types of capital stock depreciate at the same rate 
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where in addition to the above variables, Sg and Sp now denote public and private 
investment respectively; and α and β denote the shares of public and private capital 
in income. 
The specification of Equations (1) and (2) is based on a strong assumption that 
all countries are at their steady states. However, it is possible to extend Equation (2) 
to allow estimation of the effect of various explanatory variables on per capita 
growth. 
Following Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), it can be shown that Equation 
(2) can be transformed into an equation for the steady state growth path as follows: 
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where the left-hand side of the equation is the growth of per capita income, λ = (n + 
γ + δ)/(1– α – β) is the speed of convergence and y(0) is income per capita at some 
initial date; the other variables are defined as before. 
Equation (3) is the basis for the empirical analysis of the effect of public and 
private investment on per capita growth. The estimates of variants of Equation (3) 
5This equation can be derived readily from a Cobb-Douglas production function.  For details, see 
Khan and Kumar (1997).  
∈ ... ... (2) 
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are all obtained in unrestricted form, that is without imposition of the theoretical 
restrictions across the parameters of the various explanatory variables. 
In estimating Equation (3), allowance is made for cross-country differences in 
γ, reflecting technical change, as well as differences in human capital and 
macroeconomic stability. Concerning technical change, it is sometimes suggested 
that in the long-run both the “disembodied” and the “embodied” technical change in 
a country are related to its exposure to foreign trade and investment. Several recent 
theoretical and empirical contributions link such exposure to foreign markets, 
managerial techniques, etc. This link allows for not only a one-time shift in 
production possibilities, but also for sustained increases in growth rates due to 
dynamic scale economies and learning by doing [Grossman and Helpman (1990); 
Edwards (1992)]. Instead of assuming γ to be constant across countries, in the 
empirical specification it is allowed to vary as a function of a country’s trade 
orientation and the inflow of foreign direct investment. The procedure adopted is to 
assume that for the average of the sample the value for γ assumed by Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil (1992)—2 percent a year—holds. Deviations from this average 
value are then related to trade orientation measured by the average share of exports 
and imports to GDP, and to the inflows of foreign direct investment relative to GDP. 
Following the recent literature on growth, human capital—which has received 
considerable emphasis in explaining cross-country differences in long-run growth—
was incorporated as an explanatory variable.
6 Finally, macroeconomic instability, 
which has been shown to adversely affect growth, was also considered.
7 One of the 
key measures of such instability—budgetary deficits—was introduced into the 
equation as an additional explanatory variable. 
 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
1.  Effects on Growth 
Consider first the empirical results for the model in Equation (3) with 
aggregate investment as the main explanatory variable and technological change 
invariant across countries. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 2 provide these results for 
three different periods—1970–90, 1970–80, and 1980–90.
8 Column (1) shows that 
for the 1970–90 period as a whole, the fit of this equation is quite good; nearly a 
third of the cross-country variation in per capita real GDP growth over the past two 
decades is explained by the variation in the investment ratio, initial per capita 
6For a discussion of the importance of human capital in the growth process, see Lucas (1988); 
Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992). 
7For an analysis of the relationship between macroeconomic stability and growth, see Frenkel and 
Khan (1990) and Fischer (1993). 
8For the sample of developing countries and data definitions and sources, see Appendix.  Mohsin S. Khan  426
income, and population growth. All the variables have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. The variable of special interest is the investment ratio. The 
estimated coefficient suggests that a one percentage point increase in the investment 
ratio across developing countries is associated with an increase in per capita real 
GDP of three-quarters of a percentage point.
9 For the sub-periods the patterns are 
similar, although the coefficients of the investment ratio, as well as the fits of the 
equation, are somewhat lower than for the full period. 
Now one can proceed to consider the separate roles played by public and 
private sector investment in determining per capita growth. As indicated in Column 
(4) of Table 2, while both types of investment had a positive impact in the estimates 
for the full period 1970–90, their magnitude differed considerably, with private 
investment having a much stronger impact than public sector investment. However, 
the results for two sub-periods diverge markedly: during the 1970s, both public and 
private investment had a similar effect and it was only during the 1980s that the 
greater impact of private sector investment emerged. One explanation for this 
difference could be that in the earlier period the stock of infrastructural capital was 
lower in most developing countries, and thus the returns from such investment were 
higher. Put this way, it can be argued that there was much more complementarity 
between private and public investment than was the case during the last decade. 
An attempt was made next to see whether allowing technical change to vary 
across countries alters these basic results. Assuming a given average rate of technical 
change, it was postulated that technical change was a function of a country’s trade 
orientation and the flow of foreign direct investment, and a country-specific proxy 
was accordingly constructed. In none of the estimates of Equation (3) did this proxy 
appear significant, or lead to any change in the relative effect of public and private 
investment, compared to the original assumption of no cross-country variation. This 
result could be due to the fact that in the original specification of Equation (3) there 
is an implicit restriction that the coefficient on technical change (in conjunction with 
population growth) is equal in size to the sum of the coefficients on public and 
private investment. The lack of any statistical significance of this proxy may simply 
reflect a rejection  of this restriction. When the trade and the direct investment ratios 
were entered independently in the regression equation, they had a positive but 
statistically weak effect that did not alter the earlier results. 
The extent to which taking into account human capital and budgetary position 
changes the basic conclusion was also examined. The stock of human capital was 
9Note that from the initial income variable, one can obtain the rate of convergence among 
developing countries, which turns out to be 0.01. This implies that once the cross-country variation in 
investment and population growth is taken into account, the poorer developing countries (measured by 
their per capita income in 1970) narrowed the gap between them and the richer developing countries at a 
rate of roughly 1 percent a year.  For further details, see Khan and Kumar (1997) and International 
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proxied by the average of the proportion of population with school enrolment at the 
primary and secondary school level. The budgetary variable was the balance of the 
general government as a proportion of GDP averaged over the entire period or the 
two sub-periods. As shown in Column (7) of Table 3 both these variables enter the 
regression with the expected sign, are statistically significant, and generally improve 
the explanatory power of the equation.
10 
 
2.  Regional Variation 
An analysis was also undertaken to assess the impact of regional differences 
by re-estimating Equation (3) with slope dummies for both private and public 
investment for each of the four regions. The results in Table 3 show that for the 
1979–90 period, the regional slope dummies increase considerably the explanatory 
power of the Equation, which now accounts for over half the cross-country variation 
in per capita growth of real GDP. The standard “F” test of no differences in the 
impact of public and private sector investment was strongly rejected. The regional 
differences were quite marked and accorded with standard priors. For Africa, and to 
some extent for the Middle East, both types of investment exercised a similar impact, 
while in Latin America public investment appeared to have had, on average, very 
limited impact and private investment a pronounced positive effect. In Asia, public 
investment was statistically significant, but had an effect on growth only about half 
that of private investment. 
A somewhat different picture emerged for the two sub-periods. During the 
1970s, public investment had a statistically insignificant impact in both Asia and 
Latin America, but a significant one in Africa, where the size of the coefficient 
exceeded that on private investment, as well as in the Middle East grouping. During 
the 1980s, for both Africa and the Middle East the size and significance of the 
coefficients of public investment declined, while for the other two regions there is no 
noticeable change. This result implies that the difference between the impact of 
private and public investment across all developing countries during the last two 
decades is largely due to variations in the effects in the African and Middle Eastern 
regions. 
It is also interesting to consider whether the above regional differences were 
associated with differences in income and the level of development across developing 
countries. It could be argued that in low-income countries, regardless of the region, the 
need for infrastructure public investment is likely to be greater than in the high-
10The average rate of consumer price inflation was also considered as a proxy for macroeconomic 
instability.  It had the correct sign and was statistically significant when it was included by itself; however, 
when it was included together with budgetary balances, it became insignificant.  Since the fiscal position 
and inflation are generally closely related, particularly in developing countries, this result is not altogether 
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income countries. Furthermore, in the high-income countries, the private sector is 
likely to be sufficiently developed to provide many of the goods and services which 
otherwise would have to be provided by the public sector. Hence, in the low-income 
countries the impact of public investment may be greater than in the high-income 
countries. This hypothesis was tested by reestimating Equation (3) by including two 
slope-dummies for public investment: one for countries in the low-income group 
(defined as the bottom one-third of all countries ranked by per capita GDP in 1970) 
and the other for countries in the high-income group. The results showed that the 
impact of public investment in the low-income group was noticeably greater than in 
the high-income group—the slope coefficients had values of 0.33 and 0.25, 
respectively—but it still remained less than the effect of private investment. 
 
3.  Two-stage Least Squares Estimates and Panel Data 
There are two types of extensions which can be made to the empirical 
analysis. The first is econometric, namely to explicitly take into account the 
correlation between the right-hand-side variables such as private investment and the 
error term. In order to examine whether using alternative estimation procedures 
alters the basic results in any marked manner, estimates using Two-Stage Least 
Squares (TSLS) were also obtained. A second extension would be to use pooled 
rather than cross-sectional data, so that information on the dynamics of the growth 
process can be taken into account. Although long-run growth is more appropriately 
examined in a cross-sectional framework, the relationship between public and private 
investment and growth was also examined using pooled time-series cross-section 
data to assess the robustness of the results reported above. 
The results of TSLS shown in Table 4 suggest conclusions that are broadly 
similar to those obtained using the OLS. Private investment has a decidedly higher 
effect on growth compared to public investment, and the human capital variable has 
a positive coefficient that is not statistically significant. 
With regard to the use of panel data, there are two additional issues that should 
be noted. The first is the period over which the time series data are averaged, since the 
use of annual data would be inappropriate for analysing the growth process and in any 
case would exhibit excessive noise. The procedure adopted was to average growth over 
a period ranging from three to five years.
11 This is a more general procedure than that 
in the literature where growth has been arbitrarily averaged over five-year periods. The 
second issue concerns the use of specific model estimation procedures for panel data. 
The results presented use OLS on the full sample.
12 
11When the average is for three years, there are six observations per country, giving a pooled 
sample for the 95 countries of 570 observations.  With a five-year average, there are four observations per 
country giving a sample of 380 observations. 
12See Cheng (1986) for a discussion of the different procedures that could be used to estimate the 
model. Government Investment and Economic Growth  431
Since the panel procedures assume common slope coefficients for all 
observations, they are rather restrictive. Nevertheless, even with this restriction, the 
results presented for the three- and five-year horizons reinforce the earlier findings 
using cross-sectional data (Table 4, Columns (3-4). A number of additional 
interesting results also emerge. For instance, given the shorter time horizon, there is 
now virtually no relationship between initial GDP and subsequent growth. The 
human capital variable, while positive, has a statistically weak effect. An interesting 
result is the relatively similar effect of private and public investment on growth in 
Asia. For this region, it could be argued that in the short run public investment 
provided an equal boost to growth as did private investment, but this effect was not 
sustained over time. 
 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SPEED OF CONVERGENCE 
This section looks at the implications of the above empirical findings for the 
speed of convergence of real per capital incomes among developing countries. Since 
private investment appears to have had a considerably larger impact on per capita 
growth than public investment, the steady-state growth rate of an economy would 
increase in proportion to the share of private investment. However, this result says 
very little about the speed with which the steady-state path is attained, or 
equivalently, the speed of convergence among countries. For instance, even if the 
steady-state growth is significantly higher because of private investment, the speed 
of transition towards this steady state, or the rate of convergence, may remain 
unaffected. 
From a policy-maker’s perspective, whether or not the speed can be affected 
by policy changes may perhaps be as important as the effect of policy changes on the 
growth path itself. This is so since the transition to an optimal growth path, in the 
framework utilised above, is likely to last a considerable length of time, and any 
measures which can speed up that process would be regarded as highly desirable. 
Hence, in the literature on the determinants of long-run growth and convergence, 
while the emphasis has been mainly on factors determining the steady-state growth 
path, the issue of the speed of transition has also received significant attention. [See, 
for example, Lucas (1988); Romer (1989); Barro (1991); Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)]. 
The methodology for examining this issue is to introduce an additional 
regressor in Equation (3), which is an interactive term consisting of the product of 
the log of initial income and public investment ratio. The specific form of this 
equation is 
Ln(y(t)) Ln(y( )) ( e )  ( (Ln(S) Ln(n )) 
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If the coefficient on the interactive term in Equation (4), plus the coefficient on the 
initial income term, is smaller than that on initial income term alone (without the 
additional regressor), it would mean that countries with more public investment have 
a higher speed of convergence. If the combined coefficient is unchanged, it would 
mean that the share of public investment does not affect the speed of convergence. If, 
however, it is larger, then public investment slows down the rate of convergence. 
This procedure is then repeated with private investment and a comparison is made of 
the speed of convergence. 
The results of estimating Equation (4) are given in Table 5. Column (1) of this  
 
Table 5 
Public and Private Investment and Speed of Convergence
1 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant –2.59
a   –3.34
a –2.31
a 
 (0.89)  (0.84)  (0.85)
  




 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
 




 (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.14) 
 
Initial GDP and Public Investment    –0.03
a 
   (0.01) 
 
Initial GDP and Private Investment      0.03
a 
     (0.01) 
 




 (0.32)  (0.31)  (0.32) 
 
Human Capital  0.18
b 0.17
b 0.18 
 (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.11) 
 
Implied Rate of Convergence  0.013  0.010  0.017 
   
R
2 0.35  0.39  0.39 
 
S.E.E. (0.33)  (0.41)  (0.41) 
1The dependent variable is per capita GDP growth during 1970–90.  For other notes, see Table 2. Government Investment and Economic Growth  433
table indicates that without separating the impact of public and private investment, 
the implied rate of convergence among the developing countries was 0.013. 
However, as Column (2) indicates, when the interactive term is introduced, although 
the coefficient on this term is negative, the combined effect (in terms of the 
coefficient on the initial income) is now smaller. This yields a speed of convergence 
which is somewhat slower than the speed of convergence without the interactive 
term. However, as Column (3) shows, when a similar procedure is undertaken with 
private investment, although the coefficient on private investment is positive, the net 
effect is greater. Thus an increase in private investment increases the speed of 
convergence by around a third compared to an increase in public investment. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has considered a number of issues relating to the extent to which 
public and private investment exert a differential effect on long-run growth of 
developing countries. The empirical analysis took account of other determinants of 
per capita growth, including population growth, human capital formation, trade 
orientation, and measures of macroeconomic instability. 
Utilising a large sample of 95 developing countries over the period 1970–90, a 
variety of empirical tests were undertaken. The main results can be summarised as 
follows. 
First, there is a substantial difference in the impact of private and public sector 
investment on growth, with private investment having a much larger impact than 
public investment, especially during the 1980s. This finding holds up even when 
other determinants of per capita growth are taken into account, alternative estimation 
techniques are used, and with data averaged over different periods. 
Second, there are significant regional variations in both the effect of public 
and private investment on growth. The difference between the effects is most 
apparent for Latin America and Asia, but much less pronounced for Africa and the 
Middle East country groupings. There is also a significant difference across different 
income groups. 
Finally, the relative shares of public and private investment appear to have 
altered not only the steady-state growth path, but also the speed of convergence of 
real per capita incomes among developing countries. A higher share of private 
investment in the total appears to be associated with an increase in the speed of 
convergence. 
In conclusion, it is evident from the analysis in this paper that studies of the 
growth process in developing countries should make a distinction between the 
respective roles of public and private capital formation. Furthermore, the empirical 
evidence supports the proposition that private investment has a stronger effect on 
growth than does public investment. This result is consistent with the now widely  Mohsin S. Khan  434
accepted paradigm that the private sector holds the key to sustained growth and 
economic development. Yet at the same time, the government can play a critical part 
in the process by identifying much more rigorously the types of investment that have 
positive net returns and are likely to be complementary to the private sector. Public 
investments that do not meet these criteria would appear to affect growth and factor 
productivity adversely, and thus should be cut or not undertaken. Governments in 




SAMPLE AND DATA DEFINITIONS 
 
1.  Sample of Developing Countries 
The sample consists of 95 developing countries. The countries included are: 
 
(a)  Africa 
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
 
(b)  Asia 
Bangladesh, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mayanmar, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. 
 
(c)  Latin America 
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela. 
 
(d)  Middle East and Europe 
Cyprus, Egypt, Hungary, Jordan, Malta, Oman, Poland, Syria, Turkey, 
Yemen, and Yugoslavia. 
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2.  Data Definitions and Sources 
  y  :  real GDP per capita in (1985 international prices). 
  n : population  growth. 
  I  :  ratio of total fixed investment to GDP. 
  Ig  :  ratio of public sector fixed investment to GDP (public sector includes 
general government, nonfinancial state enterprises, and principal 
autonomous agencies). 
  Ip  :  ratio of private sector fixed investment to GDP. 
  H
P  :  gross enrolment ratio at primary level. 
  H
s  :  gross enrolment ratio at secondary level. 
  FDI  :  ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP. 
  T  :  trade orientation defined as the ratio of the average of exports and imports 
to GDP. 
  D  :  ratio of the stock of external debt to GDP. 
  GBG  :  public sector balances as a percent of GDP. 
 
For Tables 2 and 3, all ratios and growth rates are averages for the period 
1970–80, 1980–90, and 1970–90; H
p and H
s are for the beginning of each period. In 
Table 5, the ratios are averages for 3 and 5 years, and H
p and H
s are again for the 
beginning of each period. 
Data on y were obtained largely from Summers and Heston (1988) and (1991) 
for the period up to 1985 and were extended to 1990 using per capita growth rates 
from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database; for some low-income 
countries data were obtained from Ahmad (1992). Data on n, FDI, and T were from 
the WEO database. Data on I, Ig, Ip, Kg and Kp were obtained from the World Bank’s 
“DEC Analytical Database,” supplemented by data from the International Finance 
Corporation database on private investment and from the WEO database. Data for H
p 
and H
s for the period up to 1980 are from the UNESCO publication “Trends and 
Projections of Enrolment by Level of Education and by Age” (March 1983), and 
from UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks thereafter. 
Estimates of public and private capital stock were obtained using the perpetual 
inventory method, data on public and private gross investment, and estimates of 
initial capital stocks in 1960. The depreciation rate for the two types of capital stock 
was assumed to be similar and varied between 4 and 5 percent per annum. 
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This  is an interesting paper in an area of vital importance to policy-makers. The 
basic objective of the study is to ascertain the relative importance of public  and private 
investment in promoting and sustaining growth in the developing countries. To what 
extent the study has realised this objective, or the appropriateness of the selection of the 
sample of countries, and the methodology used, is examined  in the following. 
The paper points out that private investment tends to promote the GDP more than 
public investment. However, this result alone can  hardly help in policy formulation 
especially because of the  following results  reported  in the study: 
  (i) The paper  suggests quite  rightly that public and private investments are 
complementary. Seen in that  context, would it not mean that a reduction in 
public investment implies a fall in the effectiveness of private  sector investment 
as well? 
  (ii) The result that growth elasticity of public sector is relatively smaller may 
indicate that either public sector is relatively less efficient or that it has over-
expanded. Interestingly enough, the effectiveness of private and public sector 
was the  same in the earlier period, indicating that public investment is not 
inherently inefficient. 
  (iii) The fall in the growth of elasticity of public investment in the later periods has 
been ascribed by the author to relative abundance of infrastructure in the latter 
period but no evidence of that has been presented. 
  (iv) Has the public investment gone beyond the optimal level? The paper hardly 
contains any  discussion on that  issue. Moreover, this can only be done by 
disaggregating the public investment and looking at the availability of 
infrastructure compared to requirement. No such analysis has been done either. 
  (v) If public investment is less efficient, should the private sector be inducted in 
infrastructure development? Would privatisation of infrastructure  result in 
lower or higher level of industrial growth because private motive on the part of 
private sector may result in higher cost of infrastructures? 
Table 2 shows rather interesting results. The growth elasticity with respect to 
investment is significantly higher in the earlier period, i.e., 1970–90, than in either of the 
two sub-periods. Such a result is not expected and one wonders if it is the result of some 
specification error or some other error. It needs to be looked into. 
The elasticity of both public and private investment is very similar during 1970–
80 period, but in  the 1980–90 period the elasticity with respect to public investment 
falls. Dr Khan has explained this by referring to inadequacy of infrastructure in 1970–80 Comments  439
which supposedly was quite adequate in the 1980–90 period. This needs verification 
especially because public investment fell in the latter period and in some cases net 
investment may have even turned negative. Pakistan probably provides a clear example 
of that. 
The methodology employed in the paper to determine the impact of private and 
public investment on the growth consists  of a regression of growth in a country against 
the private and public investment. The problems associated with such a cross-country 
analysis are quite well-known. 
The analysis assumes that depreciation of the capital stock in private and public 
sectors is the same. Such an assumption is not tenable because public sector investments 
being in infrastructures have a longer life. What impact it will have on the analysis 
needs to be looked into. 
With a view to examining the impact of technical change arising from the 
openness of the economy, the deviation from 2 percent technical change has been used 
as an explanatory variable. Why the variable had to be defined in such a way is not very 
clear. 
On page 12 [of the original conference paper] the author suggests restrictions on 
the original specification that the magnitude of the coefficient of technical change would 
be equal to sum  of the coefficient of public and private investment. This specification 
may be causing problems and an equation  free from such restrictions may be tried. 
How was the sample of the countries chosen? Was it purposive? Why were just 
14 countries from Asia chosen against the 46 from Africa? Does it not bias the results? 
If the sample  from Asia is enhanced, what would be the impact on the result? This 
needs to be examined. 
Although an interesting study, it does not succeed much in realising the objective 
which it had laid out for itself. It also fails to take note of the studies already done on 
Pakistan on this subject. While earlier studies in Pakistan do show that the private and 
public sector investments are complementary, they have not examined their contribution 
to growth. Accordingly, disaggregated analysis is required across the countries, and 
similar analysis may be done for each of the countries.  
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